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what people are writing about

Long-term readers of this magazine will be surprised
at the length of this month’s review of books and
magazines. The reason is the extreme length of the
review of Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Prac
tices by Peter F. Drucker, which opens this section.

Management: Tasks, Responsi
bilities, Practices by Peter F.

Drucker, Harper & Row, New
York, 1973, 839 pages, $15.

Which modern company would
come to mind first as an outstand
ing example of the best in man

The editors believe, however, that the importance of
Mr. Drucker’s latest work to all who are concerned
with any aspect of management is so great that the
expansion of the review section in this issue is com
pletely warranted.

agement-Sears, Roebuck or Gen
eral Motors?

Sears, Roebuck on all counts is
the unequivocal answer of Peter F.
Drucker in his new book, Man
agement: Tasks, Responsibilities,
Practices. Sears, Roebuck meets al

most all his criteria for the well
managed business.
First it identified its particular
market, one that had never been
tapped before; the country’s vast
number of farm families who were
totally isolated when Sears was first
organized and who had no means
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of shopping except on rare visits to
the nearest community. Second, it
developed a means of presenting a
quantity of every conceivable kind
of goods for such families to choose
from, showing them pictorially
through its ubiquitous mail order
catalog. Third, reliability of all
the goods and complete honesty in
their presentation were decreed as
essential since the farmers’ very
isolation made it impossible for
them to return unsatisfactory mer
chandise.
All of these criteria Sears has met
brilliantly, according to the author,
for nearly three-quarters of a cen
tury. Mail order selling before
Sears’ arrival had been a frenetic
business, consisting of disposal of
remnants at inflated prices through
exaggerated claims in the mails.
Sears reversed all these premises.
Its catalog published regularly, be
came a “wish book” for its farmer
clients, and its reputation for com
plete reliability in what was prom
ised and what was delivered soon
became a byword. Caveat emptor
became caveat vendor—Sears’ pol
icy from the very beginning was
“Your money back and no ques
tions asked” for any dissatisfied
customer.
New work approach needed

This radically new approach to
selling demanded many things of
management that were totally new,
buyers for this kind of operation,
accountants who could devise con
trols for the enormous and fast
moving inventories necessary, and
clerks who could handle the mail
orders promptly and accurately.
It even had to develop the first
mass production plant in the world.
Five years before Henry Ford
started his first automobile down
the assembly line, Sears had a mail
order plant with the “breakdown of
all work into simple, repetitive op
erations, with an assembly line,
conveyor belt, standardized, inter
changeable parts and, above all,
with planned plant-wide schedul
ing.”
Moreover, Sears has kept up
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with its market. With the coming
of the automobile and the end of
the farmer’s absolute remoteness
from even small-town stores, Sears
kept pace by opening retail stores
in the towns to serve both the old
farm customers and the urban
working class, now earning more
money and wanting a different
type of goods. It was still a market
with limited purchasing power, but
it now wanted what its more af
fluent countrymen could afford. It
was Sears’ business to find manu
facturers who could supply this
market—and to offer them enough
sales volume to make it worth their
while. So Sears began to manufac
ture its own goods in such fields as
refrigerators, radios, and, later,
washing machines.
In effect, a merchandising em
pire (the most successful in history,
according to Drucker), had been
built on three cardinal precepts:
absolute identification with the
customer in a specialized market,
scrupulous research into his needs,
and absolute honesty in dealing
with him.
This has always been Sears’ basic
operating philosophy: everything
for the customer, everything to
meet his needs. It has carried the
merchandiser into such new fields
as high fashion merchandise (as
customers’ incomes have risen);
and into all types of insurance.
General Motors, although it gets
high marks for its management
from Drucker, doesn’t come off
nearly as well as Sears. It has been
immensely more profitable than
Sears, but profit is is not the end
result of the most successful man
agement, according to the author.
“The first test of any business is
not the maximization of profit but
the achievement of sufficient profit
to cover the risks of economic ac
tivity and thus to avoid loss,” says
Drucker.
His book, which is far too long,
839 pages, is divided into three
sections, “The Tasks,” “The Man
ager, Work, Jobs, Skills and Organ
ization,” and “Top Management;
Tasks, Organization, Strategies.”
Of these, the third section is by far

the best, except for a fascinating
picture of the differing approaches
to management training in a Japa
nese company, a German com
pany, and an American company,
which appears in the first section.
Japanese “system”

The typical Japanese company
looks like the extreme of the
Theory X of management, the car
rot and stick approach to working
relationships, at first glance. But
closer examination betrays some
very significant differences that ex
ist between Theory X and the Jap
anese manufacturing company.
The Japanese worker, bound to
his company almost for life, is sub
ject to the same pressures from
management and industrial engi
neers that assembly line workers in
Detroit are. But then:
“. . . the Japanese industrial en
gineer does not organize the work
er’s job. When he has reached the
point at which he understands the
work, he turns over the actual de
sign of jobs to the work group it
self. Actually, the industrial engi
neer begins to work with the peo
ple who have to do the job long
before he finishes his analysis. He
will study the work the same way
his Western counterpart does. But
he will, in his study, constantly use
the work force itself as his ‘re
source.’ When he has finished his
analysis, the synthesis will essen
tially be done by the work group
itself. The industrial engineer con
tinues his activities, but he does so
as ‘assistant’ to the work group
rather than as outside analyst.”
The Japanese worker also takes
responsibility for improving his
tools. Machines are, of course, de
signed by the engineer, but when
a new machine or a new process is
being introduced, workers are ex
pected to take an active part in the
final adjustment. In many instances,
the work force actually participates
in machine design; it acts as a re
source to machine or process de
signer.
This system is reinforced by con
tinuous training. Every Japanese
Management Adviser

employee, including top managers,
keeps attending weekly sessions
from employment until retirement.
Sessions are not run by trainers,
but by the participants themselves
and their supervisors. The sessions
do not focus on any one skill. They
are attended by all workers on a
given job level; and they focus on
all jobs within the unit. Their focus
is the working of the entire busi
ness rather than the individual job
of any one man.
The “godfather”

There is another peculiarity of
..the Japanese “system” which pro
duces uniformly good results—a
“godfather” training approach that
has more than a few of the charac
teristics of the old apprenticeship,
which produced the workmen
whose loss we have been lamenting
for years. Japanese workers under
their industrial system are divided
into three classes: industrial work
ers, clerical workers, and manage
ment workers. These are rigid
classes, with no crossover from one
to the other. But within the mana
gerial class, from which, eventu
ally, top managers will be selected,
each worker is assigned a “god
father,” someone in the manage
ment ranks of the organization who
will look after his ward, be his
mentor, and guide him in the or
ganization. He may not be the
man’s boss, although he is always
in a superior position, he may not
even be in the same division, but
he is always there for advice, for
counseling—and for evaluation.
For it is his godfather who deter
mines the young manager’s ulti
mate destiny. Once a man has been
accepted into the managerial group
in a Japanese company his career
is set. Whether good or bad, he
will be given the same promotions
and the same increases in the com
pany. If he is impossibly bad, he
may be shunted off to a dead end
job. It won’t affect his seniority or
the pay increases based on senior
ity. All continues this way until he
is 45. Then everything changes.
The future directors of the com
March-April, 1974

pany are chosen, the future top
management. The others of their
age group are retained in manage
ment but their chances to reach
the top have vanished. They will
work, still getting their seniority
raises, until they are 55. Then re
tirement.
Those selected for the top posi
tions, however, can work as long as
they are able. There is no manda
tory retirement at the top.
And the godfathers of the young
candidates have a very influential,
although not precisely spelled out,
role in deciding who is top man
agement material and who is not.
The examples of successful man
agements Drucker draws from Ger
many and the United States come
significantly from one company in
each instance instead of an entire
business community. Moreover, the
two companies chosen, the Zeiss
Optical Works in Germany and
IBM here, share at least one of
the characteristics of Japanese in
dustrial organization. At Zeiss the
great innovation was participation
by the skilled worker together with
the university-trained scientist in
the design of the most complicated
types of optical glass. Zeiss also in
troduced continuous training for
even the most highly skilled work
ers as well as the scientific design
ers. The focus, as in Japan, was
not on training for promotion but
on training for improvement of
skill, tool, process, and product.
“Feedback” introduced

Zeiss added one ingredient not
in the Japanese formula: feedback.
“A craftsman is always in control
of his work” was the company by
word, and this meant constant flow
of information back to each worker
on his output and its quality.
The third example of a highly
successful management, IBM, uses
adaptations of the same Japanese
and Zeiss principles. IBM makes
incredibly complex machines, using
only semiskilled labor for the most
part. Each stage in the assembly is
broken down into a homogeneous
group of tasks, each well within

the competence of the worker. The
operations themselves are engi
neered to be as simple as possible,
but each worker is trained to be
able to do as many of them as
possible.
IBM’s “assistants”

IBM also discarded supervisors.
It has instead “assistants.” This is
not a mere change in terminology.
“Assistant” is exactly what he is.
Assistants are there to make sure
workers know their jobs and have
the proper tools. They are not
bosses and they have no disciplin
ary powers.
In each department there are
also job instructors—senior workers
who help the other workers learn
higher technical skills and solve
particularly knotty job problems.
Finally, IBM has another charac
teristic that is shared by both the
Japanese system and the Zeiss Op
tical Works. In IBM’s case it seems
to have developed more by acci
dent than by design, but it proved
so successful an accident that it
immediately became standard op
erating procedure for the company.
One time a computer model had
fallen well behind schedule, so
much so that production had to
begin before engineering work was
fully complete. Final details had to
be worked out on the production
line with engineers consulting con
stantly with “assistants” and work
ers. The result: a much better com
puter than any the company had
ever produced.
Ever since then, before IBM
launches a new design or a major
renovation of an old one, the proj
ect is assigned to a work crew be
fore it is fully designed. The “as
sistant” on the floor becomes boss
of the crew working in it and he,
his workers, and the engineers cre
ate the final design. Then assistant
and workers plan the production
layout and set up the individual
jobs needed to produce the new
machine.
The one characteristic that dis
tinguished these three national ex
amples, according to Drucker:
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“The Japanese, Abbe at Zeiss,
and Thomas Watson, Sr,, at IBM
based managing workers on work
men organizing responsibility.”
The last third of the book defin
ing top management—tasks, organ
izations, strategies—is the one that
will probably be of greatest value
to readers of this magazine. Druck
er starts by summarizing the basic
specifications of a top management
structure:
“The starting point is an analysis
of the top-management tasks.
“Each top-management task must
be clearly assigned to someone who
has direct and full responsibility
for it.
“This requires a top-management
team, with responsibilities to fit
the personalities, qualifications, and
temperaments of the members.
“Whoever has assigned responsi
bility for a top-management activ
ity is 'top-management’ whatever
his title.
“Except in the small and simple
business no one who has top-man
agement responsibilities does any
but top-management work.
“The complex business requires
more than one top-management
team, each structured according to
these rules.”
The most significant question
any management can face, accord
ing to Drucker, is “what is our bus
iness and what should it be?” And
only top management, unhindered
by operating or functional duties
can answer that. Sears, Roebuck,
with its simple mission, to supply
all the needs of an isolated, rural
population well, reliably, and hon
estly, saw that and prospered.
RCA, in spite of its leadership in
radios and phonographs, failed
miserably when it attempted to
merchandise a line of kitchen ap
pliances. Radios and phonographs
are “furniture.” Kitchen appliances
are kitchenware. The buyers are
the same but they have distinctly
different ideas of the two products.
They are, in effect, two different
markets, and woe to the manufac
turer who ignores this.
Other examples abound. General
Motors, which, when it began man
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ufacturing diesel engines, set up an
elaborate separate organization for
railroad diesels, recognizing that it
had little experience with railroad
ing and would have to approach
it carefully. But with airplane en
gines? Just another variation on
the automobile business. Only it
wasn’t. General Motors launched a
fine and healthy diesel locomotive
business which soon dominated the
market; its Allison Division, which
manufactured the airplane engines,
never did too well.
State of the board

Mr. Drucker discusses the board
of directors, which he thinks in its
present state in this country is a
dangerous anachronism serving no
useful purpose. However, he be
lieves a board is necessary and
proposes two different kinds.
One: A business board, which
can act as a group with whom top
management can consult, which
can serve as a review organ on
management’s acts, which can re
view top management and fire it
if necessary, a control group in
other words.
Two: A public and community
relations board to represent all the
constituencies that management
can never know until it is too late:
the community, the workers, the
customers. Each of these has a leg
itimate interest in the company
and its products, and its voice
should be heard. Moreover, its
value to management lies in what
it can reveal as to the public’s
thinking about the company.
It would be interesting to imag
ine just what the oil companies’
public status would be right now
if any one of them had had such
a public interest board at the be
ginning of the Arab oil embargo.
Undoubtedly many of them viewed
the embargo as an unparalleled
opportunity to increase their prof
its. What it has turned out to be
is an unparalleled opportunity to
attract consumer fury, to invite
searching Government inspection,
and to create public demand for
inquiry into taxes, oil records, oil

assets, Administration cooperation,
and a host of other matters the oil
companies could very well have
done without.
The bulk of the Drucker book
is given over to discussions of top
management organization, the pros
and cons of strategies and struc
tures, of whether it is better to
build from within or acquire
another company, when it is best
at all costs to not acquire another
company, the sympathetic “fit” and
the totally alien “fit” if another ac
quisition is made, the right size for
a company, and how to build to
that size if too small, how to cut
down to that size if too large.
For example, Drucker cites
American Motors (before the gaso
line shortage) in spite of its large
size in terms of total volume, 300,000 cars in annual production, and
sales of $1 billion, as being still too
small to be viable against the
Fords, the Chryslers, and the Gen
eral Motors. Making the same
kinds of cars these giants do,
forced to the same annual rhythm
of model changes, American can
not possibly build the distributor
ship and service network needed to
sustain its market, he maintains.
Volkswagen, however, which
capitalized on the fact that it never
did have a model change, could
and did remain viable, with a far
smaller total volume than Amer
ican Motors.
One company had found its mar
ket—or its niche in the total market
—appealed to it, and merchandised
a product almost exclusively for it.
It prospered. Another, much larger,
attempted to attack the giants of
its industry, instead of finding its
own niche in the market. As a re
sult, it was floundering until the
wholly fortuitous gas emergency
suddenly gave its sales a shot in
the arm even while it crippled its
competitors.
But if the competitors—or even
one of them—can recover fast
enough, and grind out enough
small, low gas-consumption cars to
compete with American, then their
superior distribution and service
network could turn the tide again.
Management Adviser

The Drucker book is, as already
has been pointed out, far too long.
But that does not detract from its
essential richness. Nor its essential
accuracy. For example, consider
how many of the cardinal manage
ment rules have been conspicuously
flouted by major American compa
nies that have become most famous
for their spectacular failures. Take
just one, the Penn Central railroad,
up to its time, the greatest bank
ruptcy in American history.
“1. The starting point is an
analysis of the top management
tasks . ..”
Penn Central’s most salient char
acteristic was complete confusion
at every level of management.
Every executive had as deputy
someone from the other railroad,
so that no one ever knew from
minute to minute what decision
would come from any given office.
Whoever was sitting at the desk
at the time . . .
“2. Each management task must
be clearly assigned to someone who
has direct and full responsibility
for it.”
See 1 above.
“3. The complex business re
quires more than one top-manage
ment team, each structured accord
ing to these rules.”
Here Penn Central exceeded the
precepts, having no less than three
management teams. The trouble
was, that not only did each execu
tive on each team have a deputy
who didn’t know what his chief
was doing; no division knew what
the other divisions were doing. A
worker in the financial division
could be fired—and often was—if
he was observed talking in the hall
way with someone from an operat
ing division.
Summary

Mr. Drucker has written his
usual thoughtful work, and he has
shared many provocative insights,
as well as much knowledge of man
agement in all its aspects in nearly
every nation. The book covers its
subject in every possible guise and
abounds with examples of compa
March-April, 1974

nies that nearly made it but didn’t
quite. It’s a compendium of mis
takes, with names, dates, and rea
sons, as well as a brief recital of
the success stories.
It’s a good book, in other words,
and one that every manager should
read carefully.
R.M.S.

The Encyclopedia of Manage
ment by Carl Heyel (Editor), Sec
ond Edition, Van Nostrand Rein

hold Company, New York, 1973,
1,152 pages, $32.50.
Every broad-gauged adviser to
management can recognize the
need for a concise but comprehen
sive reference work covering the
full spectrum of managerial disci
plines. This appears to be the need
which the one-volume Encyclope
dia of Management was designed
to fill. It does a commendable job.

This revised edition of a book or
iginally published in 1963 contains
over 300 alphabetically arranged
entries prepared by 200 contribut
ing authors. Each entry provides a
“quick study” briefing on a specific
management function or science.
The length of the individual en
tries averages about 3½ pages
(2,500 words), but ranges from an
overly ambitious 33 pages on “Sta
tistics” to a surprisingly superficial
half-page on “Accounting.” (In
fairness it should be mentioned
that the “Accounting” entry is fol
lowed by over 20 cross-references
to other sections of the book.)
You will not become an expert
on anything from the pages of this
book. But the researcher who wants
ready access to a quick and author
itative overview of a particular dis
cipline, along with a useful ex
posure to its “buzz words,” will
keep the volume within easy reach.
The typical entry provides an in
telligible introductory briefing on
a single topic, along with crossreferences to related entries. Each
entry also cites a well-chosen and,
mercifully, limited selection of

books, articles, periodicals, and
trade associations suitable for fur
ther research.
The editor uses an interesting
technique to make the book more
attractive to the serious reader des
pite the necessary shallowness of
some of its individual entries. For
each of 25 broad topics (such as
executive development, accounting
and control, public relations), a
“Guide to ‘Core Subject’ Reading”
lists pertinent entries as recom
mended reading. By studying each
of these entries in a specified se
quence, the reader can (it is
claimed) obtain in-depth informa
tion on the selected topic.
Subjective bias is an unavoid
able factor in editing an encyclo
pedia—and also in reviewing one.
Still, to this reviewer, there appear
to be a number of flagrant imbal
ances in the subjects covered and
in the space allotments. The justi
fication for devoting 2½ pages to
an obscure and arcane concept
called “Operating Margin Analysis”
is not clear. The discussion of
“Punched Card Data Processing,”
complete with functional descrip
tions of collators, interpreters, and
summary punches will impart more
nostalgia than useful information.
Yet nowhere in the eight-page
“Index” can mention be found of
such accepted techniques as direct
costing, profit planning, sensitivity
analysis, or short interval schedul
ing. Also lacking from the “Index”
are the words ecology, environ
ment, and energy.
On a subject of somewhat per
sonal interest to this reviewer, it
would seem desirable to combine
the entry on “CPA: Role in Man
agement Services” with that on
“Management Consulting.” Though
each of these essays is informative
and well-written, they present sur
prisingly dissimilar parochial per
spectives of the same basic topic.
On balance, though, it is a very
valuable book, particularly to the
management generalist.
John R. Mitchell
Director-Management
Advisory Services Division
AICPA
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How to Manage the Boss or The
Radovic Rule by Igor Radovic,
M. Evans & Company, Inc., New

York, 1973, 155 pages, $5.95.
Written for the “genuine” sub
ordinate who holds no dreams of
ever being propelled into the ranks
of superiors, this book provides a
humorous look at how executives
appear to their underlings.

First look at this title tells the
potential reader, “Here’s another
one of those rib ticklers’ on how to
make it into the executive suite.”
Blessedly, this book has a different
twist to it.
Advantages of subordinates

The author “has a very powerful
subordinate position at a large in
ternational bureaucracy,” and, as he
tells his readers, it is this type of
job that allows the average indi
vidual to achieve independence
and success on his own.
“In comparison with the execu
tive aspirant, the real subordinate
fares infinitely better: He does not
depend on his Superior for the ful
fillment of his ambitions, for he al
ready has the job he wants; and he
does not have to worry about keep
ing his job either, for few positions
are as secure as those that are
shunned by job seekers and are dif
ficult to fill. The real subordinate
can have both the satisfactions and
advantages of being his own master
and pay no price for it.”
If this is true, why are so many
people scrambling to get on up the
corporate ladder? Dr. Radovic says
that it is because common sense is
uncommon, but vanity is rampant.
While executive jobs may be in
short supply, there will always be
subordinate posts, he assures his
readers.
“With technology on the march,
and its administration more than
keeping step, there is no danger of
the bountiful supply of seemingly
repulsive jobs drying out in the
foreseeable future. (Remember the
computer, heralded as the bane of
drudgery and the greatest labor
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saving device of all time, which
ended up creating many more un
popular jobs than it ever elimin
ated?)”
In whatever job the subordinate
chooses to roost, he must demon
strate “expertise,” never “ability”
(which implies promotability). “Ex
pertise” is easily acquired by any
one, the good doctor states, simply
by “smothering the obvious in the
irrelevant and the obscure, prefer
ably to the accompaniment of sol
emn motions and oracular incanta
tions.”
Dr. Radovic advises that once a
suitable niche has been found, the
subordinate should diligently study
the rules and regulations of the
large organization. It is through the
strict adherence to these that such
jobs as those of elevator operators
in automatic elevators and firemen
on diesel and electric trains have
been preserved, he notes.
Dependence of superiors

The superior’s dependence on
the subordinate can be used to
make the superior more receptive
to the dominant management role
of the subordinate, he states. He
gives the example of an assistant to
the controller in a Minneapolis-St.
Paul furniture company. The as
sistant would have to coach the
controller for days in order to
enable him to make a presentation
of the balance sheet and income
statement at the quarterly Board
of Directors meeting. The assistant
was never given any recognition by
his boss. However, once the as
sistant became ill and the controller
had to prepare the presentation on
his own, nearly costing him his job.
When the assistant returned his
boss was very considerate of him.
“The assistant quickly pieced the
new picture together, saw the light,
and then made sure the change was
permanent by regularly mentioning
recurring kidney-stone troubles at
about the times the Board of Di
rectors was due to meet,” Dr. Ra
dovic recalls.
Other advice given: Subordinates
should help their superiors by pass

ing on news of executive in-fight
ing, thus diverting the superior’s
attention. Also the subordinate
should develop friendships with
VIPs, securing his place in the eyes
of his supervisor. A few compli
ments to superiors are often in
order, but on occasion egos must be
brought down to size lest the exec
utive suffer from the “Black-andBlue Chest Condition brought on
by relentless chest thumping. This
affliction is in turn usually accom
panied by a severe cranial tension
which is the result of an ego much
too big for the size of the sufferer’s
head (and leaving no space in it
for any thought and concern for the
subordinate’s welfare).” Dr. Radovic’s remedy for this disease: “lau
datory Chinese acupuncture, to
bring down the pressure in the
head and numb the simian chest
thumping impulse.”
Another Radovic observation is
that “the role of the secretary is not
decorative but strictly functional.”
He suggests that a subordinate and
his secretary should work as a
“partnership.” But he is not above
male chauvinist attitudes when he:
heads a chapter “The woman exec
utive”; quotes Sigmund Freud;
writes “Defies analysis. Best avoid
ed”; and thus concludes the chap
ter.
This little book should be enter
taining to anyone who has ever
been someone’s subordinate (which
excludes very few people) and
especially valuable to the executive
who has forgotten how much he
depends on his subordinate.
L.H.D.

How to Cost Your Labor Contract
by Michael H. Granof, The Bu
reau of National Affairs, Inc., Wash
ington, D.C., 147 pages, $10.

A CPA reports and evaluates the
way in which eleven large U.S. cor
porations cost out their labor con
tracts. He suggests that the dis
counted cash flow model may be
an important aid in collective bar
gaining.
Management Adviser

“Presently used procedures to
evaluate contract changes do not
provide labor relations managers
with an adequate understanding of
the potential impact on profits of
alternative proposals under consid
eration,” this author charges. With
few exceptions, he states, proce
dures used to evaluate contract
changes are deficient because they:
1—Utilize cost calculations that are
oriented toward the past; 2—Con
sider only the direct ramifications
of contract changes and emphasize
cost rather than effect on profits;
3—Use algorithms that are some
times improper (for instance, ne
glecting changes in benefits negoti
ated).
Applying DCF to contracts

The discounted cash flow (DCF)
method requires that cash flows
be adjusted to reflect interest that
is gained or lost because cash is re
ceived in the future rather than in
the present. Both capital expendi
tures, to which DCF is often ap
plied, and labor contracts involve
long-term commitments and vary
ing patterns of cash flow. In fact,
Dr. Granof notes, if one accepts a
sufficiently broad definition of “cap
ital expenditures,” labor contracts
could be considered one type of
them.
Among the reasons the author
gives for finding DCF particularly
attractive for making labor contract
decisions are:
“1—The model specifically takes
into account the time value of
money.
“2—The model provides a frame
of reference for a thorough and
systematic analysis of the financial
impact of a proposal. It enables
management to take into account
operational changes that the firm
is likely to make in order to adjust
to the new contract.
“3—The information returned by
the model is easy to understand,
and since the model summarizes
the value of a proposal in a single
figure, it facilitates comparisons
among alternative proposals.
“4—The model avoids problems
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of allocations inherent in evalua
tion techniques based on ‘account
ing’ income.”
Common practice in labor nego
tiations is to evaluate contract pro
posals by comparing their centsper-hour effects. Dr. Granof be
lieves that the traditional cents-perhour figure is inappropriate since it
is based exclusively on historical
information.
The cents-per-hour cost repre
sents: the net cash effect of con
tract proposals for a given pro
jected operating response divided
by the number of anticipated pro
ductive hours.
“The basic characteristic of the
required data is that they must rep
resent the labor input of future ac
tivities and must recognize the in
terrelationships between labor costs
and other aspects of the firm’s op
erations,” the author points out. He
describes the factors that must be
considered in determining the
cents-per-hour cost. These include:
effect of direct wage increase on
fringe benefit costs, cost-of-living
adjustments, compensation for time
not worked, and overtime premi
ums and shift differentials. He gives
an illustration of how the centsper-hour cost of a multi-year con
tract would be computed for the
first year.
Although the author concedes
that few, if any, firms currently use
the discounted cash flow model for
evaluating contract proposals, he
believes that it is a feasible tech
nique. One of the eleven firms he
studied identifies critical cash flows
associated with contract changes,
gives consideration to modifications
in its operations, bases all labor
cost projections on its “estimated
planning volume,” and determines
the impact of contract revisions on
cash flow and profit. For this firm,
and others like it, the discounted
cash flow model could be used
with only a relatively minor exten
sion of the techniques presently
employed, Dr. Granof states.
“The model enables firms to uti
lize information which they cur
rently compile and which would be
available to them at no additional

cost. Even if companies elect not
to introduce present value into
their evaluations, the analysis that
they perform is likely to lead to
greater understanding of the effect
on profits of contract revisions,” the
author concludes.
Dr. Granof's research was sup
ported by the William Paton Fund
of the University of Michigan
Graduate School of Business and
the accounting firm of Ernst &
Ernst.
l.h.d.

The Management of ProblemSolving: Positive Results From
Productive Thinking by Graham

Tarr, Halsted Press, New York,
1973, 160 pages, $11.75.

As CPA consultants become
more involved in social problems,
interdisciplinary teams are being
organized. How these and other
think-tank groups can be managed
most effectively is discussed in this
book.
Graham Tarr’s career has moved
from engineering, to applied tech
nological research, to a techno-mil
itary think-tank, and then to civil
operational research and econom
ics. He headed a group of projects
for the United Kingdom and led a
United Nations team.
Unfortunately he does not offer
any sure ways of controlling the
costs for a problem-solving group.
He suggests that the group leader
should give the project leader a
budget that is a little tighter than
he finds comfortable and then add
on a contingency for the unknown.
“Some time ago I tried to keep
contingencies secret, and went as
far as having two separate and de
tailed project budgets (one for
management, and one for the proj
ect team), but it was not much of a
success. The gaff was always blown
by someone. The best approach
seems to be to have an openly ad
mitted contingency, but to bring it
home to all concerned that they
are considered rather less success
ful when they eat into it.”
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Mr. Tarr firmly believes that
fewer people working for longer is
the most productive use of prob
lem-solving groups. Crash projects
produce the worse answers.
“But when the money is limited,
the case for splitting it between
parallel teams is very weak unless
the decision-maker really distrusts
all of them. A single team, well co
ordinated and with an imaginative
approach, given all the available
resources, will generally produce a
better result.”
Differing group attitudes

One of the major themes of the
book is that more attention to hu
man needs of the problem-solving
group’s members is necessary. For
instance, the author suggests a
spirit of “intellectual charity” be
fostered in an interdisciplinary
group consisting of arts, engineer
ing, and economic types.
“The engineer sees in himself
someone practical, precise, and
with a sound understanding of the
mechanical and dynamic behaviour
of the universe; he tends to think
of the arts man—and by implication
economist—as always
king
about the problem but never sitting
down to describe it systematically
with real numbers. Engineers seem
to find difficulty in believing that
there is as much complexity in a
piece of legislation, for example, as
in the mathematical description of
a mechanistic system, and that the
intellectual and logical demands
made on the arts professions are
equal to those made on his own.
“The arts man, on the other hand,
knows that the world is full of peo
ple and feels that if you can solve
the problem in human terms you
have done the hard part; he has
nothing against the engineer, but
thinks of him as a technician to
look after the nuts and bolts of the
problem after he has finished with
it. The economist veers backwards
and forwards . . . and believes he
understands both approaches and
can do a better job on each of
them.”
Mr. Tarr warns that lack of char
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ity is even more common in exam
ining the work done by outside
groups. He pragmatically notes,
“This is less harmful, of course, and
does at least liven up the day: what
happier sight than an analyst guf
fawing over the fatuity of someone
else’s report, or showing it to his
colleagues in amused disbelief. It
allows him full rein of his critical
powers without the need to be po
lite, which is a healthy form of re
laxation.”
However, after such relaxation,
Mr. Tarr recommends someone
bring the group down to earth by
saying, “Ah, well, I expect they’re
saying the same about our last re
port.”
Using assistants to do routine
work is a waste of professional staff
time. The author suggests that in
stead temporary employees be re
cruited from the computer depart
ment’s key punchers or local col
lege undergraduates or the clerical
staff of the organization being ana
lyzed.
Another suggestion he makes to
group leaders is that they spend a
good deal of time making rounds
from one desk to another discus
sing techniques and making sug
gestions.
Mr. Tarr’s book is rich in team
management suggestions, yet not
cursed with dogmatism. Sometimes
he strains for folksy analogies
(“Problem-solving is more like the
painting of a picture than the
painting of a house”), but generally
his writing is succinct and thought
provoking.
L.H.D.

How I Turn Ordinary Complaints
Into Thousands of Dollars: The
Diary of a Tough Customer by
Ralph Charell, Stein and Day,

New York, 1973, 192 pages, $6.95.

Mr. Charell has been cited in the
Guiness Book of World Records as
“the world’s most successful com
plainer.” In his book he tells how
he defended himself, profitably,
against adversaries with greater re
sources than his own.

The voice of the irate consumer
is being heard more often these
days and most companies are
aware of it, willingly or unwil
lingly. One of those who is not con
tent to grin and bear it is Ralph
Charell, a Columbia Law School
graduate and a former television
network programing executive. He
has made a hobby of speaking up
when he thinks he’s been wronged.
“More and more often, we are
forced to deal with unaccountable
employees of large conglomerates,
or faceless bureaucrats whose tele
phones are busy, out of order, or
worse, left unattended while they
filch an extra coffee break or other
wise extend their on-the-job semiretirement. Shoddy, overpriced
goods and poor services are a com
monplace,” Mr. Charell writes.
Unnecessary fears

“What can be done to correct
these imbalances? All too often, the
amount of time and effort involved
may seem prohibitive, or we may
fear that our credit rating is subject
to computer annihilation if we jus
tifiably withold payment. If we are
to be relieved of being continually
tossed up in blankets, thrown down
interpersonal air shafts, stuffed into
social drainspouts, and put on hold
buttons that end only in disconnect
signals, we must come up with a
new approach. New methods of
coping with myriad affronts, in
transigent rudeness, deceits, incom
petencies, obfuscations, procrasti
nations and other unwelcome busi
ness practices must be developed
quickly if we are to survive.”
Mr. Charell outlines the methods
he has used in his confrontations
with such opponents as Hertz car
rental, New York Telephone, Con
Edison, his landlord, a doctor, a
lawyer, and well known New
York City stores including Saks
Fifth Avenue, Macy’s, and Barney’s
Clothes. As proof of his victories,
reproductions of his refunds and
compensative checks are included.
Copies of his letters are also pro
vided for the reader’s instruction.
Sometimes it does seem that Mr.
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Charell was unreasonable and that
he spent more time than was cost
justified in rectifying the situation.
However, he says his selected ad
versaries were resistant to usual ap
peals and he spent less time pursu
ing them than other people use for
their hobbies (such as watching
football).
Hire an actor

To carry out some of Mr. Charell’s tactics you have to be pretty
self assured. For instance, he often
tells people his time is worth $100150 an hour and he has already
wasted too much of it on the mat
ter in question. He suggests that
when a case is likely to be settled
out of court, an actor be called in
to play the part of your lawyer. Not
only is an actor cheaper, but you
can hire one who looks exactly the
way you want your attorney to
look.
“Nor, as is often the case with
attorneys, can he pressure you, di
rectly or indirectly, to accept the
other side’s ridiculous first offer.
Additionally, you, the client, will
not be intimidated by your repre
sentative as is the case in the typi
cal lawyer/client relationship. You
will also not find him difficult or
impossible to speak with, because
you have purchased his time on a
preemptive basis.”
When he felt he was not given
the full bonus he was promised by
his former employer, Mr. Charell
asked an attorney’s opinion of his
case. The lawyer told him without
a written contract there was no
case. So Charell handled the case
himself and received an additional
$475.
This entertaining little book
shows how one angry man can fight
off an army of bureaucrats. It is
especially good light reading for
people in customer contact jobs
and for customers who have suf
fered inept contact.
One thing is sure: if you meet
Ralph Charell, give him what he
wants. It will save time all around.
L.H.D.
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Corporate Wives — Corporate
Casualties? by Robert Seidenberg,

AMACOM (a division of the Amer
ican Management Association), New
York, 1973, 177 pages, $10.
Dr. Seidenberg gives further con
sideration to the topic he discussed
in an essay in The Wall Street
Journal, “Dear Mr. Success: Con
sider Your Wife."

When the author’s Journal essay
appeared, he received many letters
confirming his observations. Wom
en wrote to say that, indeed, they
were losing a sense of themselves
as they transferred from commun
ity to community with their cor
porate husbands. Although his
working credentials were transfer
able from one job situation to the
next, her community and business
standing often weren’t.
This is a new slant on the prob
lem of executive mobility, a topic
which social commentators have
written about for quite some time
now.
“People do survive a dozen or
more moves—a tribute to their iron
will and determination—but the
cost in withering and alienation
may be staggering. Biologically the
human organism can withstand a
great deal, as our space probers
have clearly demonstrated. How
ever, it is often the exercising of
societal and community preroga
tives which involve power, status,
and authority, that changes exist
ing into living," Dr. Seidenberg
writes.
The psychiatrist points out that
the problem of losing credentials is
not confined to the wife. If it were
not for the emphasis Dr. Seiden
berg puts on how the Women’s
Liberation movement is providing
new moral support for women who
want to follow their own interests,
this book could have been called,
“Corporate Families — Corporate
Casualties.” He tells of cases where
women and children refused to go
along to new communities and for
sake their standings in the old ones.
“Up until now we have tried to
explain these statistics and up
heavals as cases of individual ‘sick

ness,’ ‘immaturity,’ and ‘selfishness.’
This type of name calling will no
longer serve to deal with basic in
equities and mythologies in our so
cial structure. Our world has
changed beneath our feet—past pal
liatives and platitudes suffice no
more,” Dr. Seidenberg states.
Even corporate management
shows signs of being aware of the
defects of executive mobility. The
book cites a survey that found in
1970 two-thirds of questioned ex
ecutives expected to be moved
every three years, but in 1972 only
37 per cent had the same expecta
tion.
New corporate approach

Although the book does contain
a good deal of summarization of
other published works, it also con
tains many new case histories and
Dr. Seidenberg’s own social obser
vations:
“Corporate children have been
witnesses to the discord and suffer
ing of parents who have often been
destroyed by the very success that
was to save them. Marriage and
conventional family living have lit
tle appeal for many young people
today, having seen the disasters in
their own well-fitted but ill-fated
homes,” Dr. Seidenberg observes.
He suggests that instead of order
ing executives to relocate, corpora
tions let all qualified employees
know of a job opening in another
area. In this way, those who want
to move can and those who don’t
are not penalized for being “un
cooperative.”
“Granted that there are sharp
limits to free choice in these mat
ters, no one can deny that there
is plenty of room short of anarchy
for alternative ways of handling
job assignments and business trips
that would be entirely consistent
with the movement toward human
izing corporate life,” the psychia
trist writes.
Also, he believes the achievement
motivation of both mates may one
day in the not too distant future be
essential factors in recruiting and
transferring employees.
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When the doors of the executive
suite are finally open to women,
“corporate wife” may take on a
completely different meaning. Dr.
Seidenberg comments, “Entering
high-level employment successfully
entails much more than opportun
ity, enthusiasm, and goodwill for a
woman. If she is married she will
be faced with handling a new crea
ture on the domestic front—the cor
porate husband. Will he be able to
withstand the fantasy (or reality)
of being ‘cuckolded’ by his wife for
another interest that takes her away
from him? Will he feel comfortable
about her missing dinner for that
evening meeting or being absent
for days on an important business
trip or convention? And what will
happen when a company has to
transfer a female executive from
one city to another?”
These are only some of the pro
vocative questions that this book
raises and that, one day, corpora
tions and the individuals who staff
them will have to answer for them
selves.
L.H.D.

Strategies for Survival by David
F. Linowes, AMACOM (a division
of the American Management As
sociation), New York, 1973, 231
pages, $9.75.

In the face of current social
problems, this CPA suggests that
proven business and management
techniques be applied to the public
sector. Some applications of socio
economic management are taking
place, but “we cannot afford so
slow a pace,” Mr. Linowes warns.
David F. Linowes is a partner in
Laventhol Krekstein Horwath &
Horwath, vice chairman of the
AICPA trial board, and a member
of its committee on social measure
ment. He is also a prolific writer
on the topic of socio-economic
management and has written ar
ticles for Nation's Business, The
New York Times, and Journal of
Accountancy. This book gives him
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a chance to fully explain his ideas
about how business skills can aid
in curing society’s ills.
“What we desperately need are
ways and means of improving so
cial earnings (fulfilled human
needs) along with traditional cor
porate earnings. Part of the solu
tion lies with the technology, the
very phenomenon that has contrib
uted to so many of the problems.
. . . I refer specifically to those
aspects of technology that deal
with management systems and
management information—comput
er technology, the technology of
cost effectiveness, and accounting
technology,” he writes.
Socio-economic rules

Socio-economic management is
based on the premise that profit
can be measured in terms of hu
man needs met, as well as dollars
earned. He sets forth ten rules of
socio-economic management:
“1—Tie standards and goals to
proven human needs.
“2—Apply funding by results.
“3—Use discretionary funding as
incentives.
“4—Use multidisciplinary plan
ning.
“5—Set up social profitability
audits.
“6—Establish public visibility.
“7—Prune and restructure for dy
namic growth.
“8—Vary the input mix.
“9—Stir up social competition.
“10—Fix responsibility for apply
ing SEM [socio-economic manage
ment] .”
He is completely opposed to put
ting money into social programs
that do no achieve their goals.
Funding without measurement of
achievement doesn’t work.
“New York City is perhaps the
furthest along in the implementa
tion of sophisticated measurement
and, hence, productivity improve
ment techniques. In the late 1960’s,
it set up a modified planning
programming - budgeting system
(PPBS) to analyze its operations.
Among the results were a new fire
response policy, the use of ‘slippery

water’ in fighting fires, and new
air pollution legislation.”
But socio-economic management
has been applied in other areas.
He describes projects in: Cook
County, Ill., Sewickley, Pa., Phoe
nix, Ariz., Charleston, W. Va., Den
ver, Colo., and Richmond, Va.
Socio-economic management is
being applied to social institutions
but the pace is too slow. He makes
some action recommendations de
signed to hasten the applications:
“1—Create exciting incentives.
“2—Cash in on over-60 expertise.
“3—Refine and expand the art of
technology transfer.
“4—Enlarge funding of social re
search groups.
“5—Launch a ‘businessmen for
SEM’ movement.
“6—Educate young SEM acti
vists.
“7—Sell Madison Avenue on ‘sell
ing’ America.
“8—Create ‘Distinguished Social
Service Awards.’
“9—Expand SEM task force ac
tivity.
“10—Activate political support
for SEM.”
Although a few experiments in
public problem solving have been
made in the areas of health, educa
tion, and city government, they
have been extensively publicized;
and they have been only experi
ments after all. There is a mass of
stagnation in the public sector, Mr.
Linowes observes, and it is time to
make waves.
L.H.D.

The Use of Computers for Man
agement in Industry, Interna
tional Centre for Advanced
Technical and Vocational Train
ing, Turin, Italy, 1973, 272 pages,
$3 (paperbound). The book can
be ordered from the Bookshop, In
ternational Centre for Advanced
Technical and Vocational Training,
140 Corso Unita d’Italia, I-10127
Turin, Italy, at $3 per copy plus $2
postage for North America.

This paperbook, the proceedings
of a symposium of U.S. and Russian
Management Adviser

computer specialists, is probably of
value more as a symbol of an un
usual event than for the actual con
tent, but those with professional
interest in either the USSR or com
puters may find something of tech
nical use in some of the papers.
“The unprecedented seminar” on
which this book was based took
place in July of 1970. The Soviet
group, led by Dr. J. M. Gvishiani,
deputy chairman of the state com
mittee of the USSR Council of Min
isters on Science and Technology,
included economists, industrial min
isters, systems managers, and pro
fessors. The American delegation,
led by Richard M. Cyert, then dean
of the Graduate School of Indus
trial Administration of CarnegieMellon University, Pittsburgh, in
cluded mostly professors and deans,
with a few representatives from
industry.
Twenty-one papers are repro
duced in the book. The American
ones dealt with such subjects as the
impact of computers on manage
ment, a model for resource man
agement in a growing market, tech
niques of systems analysis and de
sign, industrial applications of linear
programing, simulation of the job
shop process, applications of micro
simulation to production manage
ment, forecasting, the use of data
transmission in large American cor
porations, how to organize the in
troduction of computers, computer
languages and systems develop
ment, and the role of industry in
education for information process
ing. For the most part they plowed
familiar ground, probably reflecting
uncertainty as to just how familiar
the Russians were with American
computer development.
The Russian approach

The Russian papers, in contrast,
dealt with such topics as an eco
nomic model of the management of
an industry, mathematical model
ing and optimization methods in
control of discrete production, some
aspects of software for program
control, long-term technological
forecasting, problems in design of
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real-time control systems, methods
of optimization of the size of an
industrial enterprise, stages of de
velopment of automatic control sys
tems of enterprises, university pro
grams for training specialists in
automated management systems,
and training of industrial personnel
for work with computerized man
agement systems. All were highly
mathematical, apparently designed
to impress the Americans with
Soviet technical expertise. Whether
they are impressive or not is for the
computer specialist to judge.
This book will probably be of
great value to professional Russiawatchers and possibly to some com
puter specialists. For the rest of us
its significance lies in the fact that
the conference took place and that
there probably will be others.
L.S.

I Hate to See a Manager Cry or
How to Prevent the Litany of
Management from Fouling Up
Your Career by Martin R. Smith,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Com

pany, Reading, Mass., 1973, 209
pages, $5.95.

The worst possible error made by
men who seek to improve their
business performance by study is
to believe all the junk prescribed
by lecturers and texts on achieving
management success, this author
declares. Instead, he suggests,
aspiring businessmen should try the
advice contained in this particular
management text.

The author of this book de
scribes himself as “an insider” in
management. He says he has man
aged functions in production, qual
ity control, industrial engineering,
and production control; was asso
ciated for a time with a national
management consulting firm; and
currently is an independent con
sultant.
This biography, which specifies
no corporate names, is somewhat
vague, to say the least, and the
reader is left to wonder whether
Mr. Smith so veils his identity be
cause he fears that the iconoclasm

of his style will hurt his profes
sional reputation or whether he is
genuinely obscure. After reading
the book you will be inclined to
suspect the latter.
For Mr. Smith’s iconoclasm, as
is the case with so many books of
this genre, turns out to be little
more than a device to attract at
tention. He starts off boldly enough
attacking “the following golden
rules (or variants of them) for
achievement of executive success:
“1. Be nice to people. 2. Learn
technical competence. 3. Don’t pass
the buck. 4. Admit your mistakes.
5. Give credit where due. 6. Act
inspired. 7. Communicate well. 8.
Plan ahead. 9. Be loyal. 10. Think.”
Promise soon evaporates

“Unsuspecting managers who al
low themselves to be influenced by
all of this are not only headed for
ignominy, but they are liable to be
come raving idiots to boot. Even if
it were possible to assimilate and
practice all of these rules, they are
no guarantee of success. In fact,
they are misleading if only because
they neglect to establish the hard
core business realities—the way
things really are.”
But when he gets down to cases
in the main part of the book, his
advice is far from earth-shaking.
All of it has been said before—much
of it by Robert A. Townsend, whom
the author admires, but much of it
also by Lyndall F. Urwick and
other authors on management of
more academic bent.
Book of moderate benefits

The book consists of a series of
brief prescriptive essays, loosely
grouped under such headings as
“Recognizing Management Dis
eases”; “Circumventing Corporate
Politics”; “Handling Corporate Per
sonalities”; “Debunking Accepted
Personnel
Theories”;
“Getting
There: Selecting the Right Job”;
“Staying There: Techniques for
Success”; and “Moving Ahead: Do
ing the Right Things.” The advice
is for the most part sound, and the
style is lively and anecdotal. All in
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all, this is an entertaining, moder
ately worthwhile book but not one
that is likely to change anyone’s life.
L.S.

Briefly listed
Selection of Terminals and Data
Protection by the Association for
Systems Management, 24587 Bag
ley Road, Cleveland, Ohio, 1973,
38 pages, $4 (paperbound).

This booklet is designed to assist
the manager in selecting remote
terminal computer equipment suit
able for his needs.
The components of a remote ter
minal system are discussed in the
first, and longest, section of the
booklet. It includes descriptions
and definitions of equipment and
services involved in time sharing.
A method of selecting appropri
ate equipment to do a specific job
is presented in the second section.
A short final section is about the
security of terminal systems and
how to protect them from theft,
fraud, sabotage, malfunctions, hu
man errors, and effects of Nature.

MAGAZINES
A Scoring Methodology for As
sessing the Suitability of Man
agement Science Models by Wil
liam E. Souder, Management Sci

ence, June, 1972.

A study, based partly on a doc
toral dissertation, develops a suit
ability index for evaluating project
selection models. By a series of per
sonal and telephone interviews
with R & D administrators and
management scientists, five major
criteria, together with a list of
characteristics pertaining to each,
are combined to form an overall
rating system. The reliability and
the validity of the rating system are
diagnosed in an application to 26
R & D selection models.
In obtaining a list of potentially
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suitable criteria and criterion char
acteristics, 52 subjects were inter
viewed for this purpose. Twenty-six
were R & D administrators selected
from large firms in the chemical,
electronics, pharmaceutical, and
aerospace industries, and 26 were
practicing management scientists.
Then, by re-interviewing the above
respondents, the list was narrowed
to five suitability criteria, each with
its own small list of (suitability)
characteristics. The five criteria
are: realism, flexibility, capability,
ease of use, and cost.
Scoring method

With the five criteria and their
characteristics, the following pro
cedure is used to construct the
scoring index. First, the raw scores
are developed. A '1' and a ‘0’ are
assigned to the respective presence
or absence of a criterion character
istic in a particular model being ex
amined. The '1's and ’0’s are added
for each criterion and expressed as
a fraction of the criterion’s total
possible score. These are called rel
ative scores. To construct the over
all suitability index, a set of weights
is established. In terms of impor
tance realism is weighted four units;
flexibility, three units; capability,
two units; use, two units; and cost,
one unit. The suitability score of a
model is the weighted sum of the
relative scores. The weights are
average rankings based on data
provided by the interviews.
As the suitability measures may
not be completely accurate, the
possibility of random error is ac
counted for by using confidence in
tervals. The intervals are arbitrarily
chosen as ± 1 for the relative scores
of each criterion and then weighted
in the same manner as described in
the construction of the suitability
score errors: for any one model to
be significantly more suitable than
another, its score must exceed the
others by at least twice the magni
tude of its score error. This is some
what analogous to a statistical test
of significance at the 95 per cent
level.
By this method a model can be

assessed as significantly more suit
able than another. Furthermore,
models can be evaluated in terms
of their five component criteria.
When applied to 26 R & D proj
ect selection models, the index
failed to detect any significant dif
ferences in four linear models se
lected. Five nonlinear models were
tested and only two were indicated
as different. The methodology could
neither discriminate between any
of the zero-one models nor any of
the scoring-type models. One out of
nine selected profitability models
was found to differ in the test. Not
withstanding the poor performance
of the index on an aggregate basis,
comparisons of individual criteria
highlighted a number of dissimi
larities. For instance, it is shown
that the linear, non-linear, and
zero-one type models have the
highest realism, flexibility, and cap
ability, whereas the profitability
and the scoring index variants have
the superior use and cost perform
ance scores.
Choosing best model

Choosing the most suitable
model is a problem that is not only
faced by R & D administrators. The
ranking of alternative frameworks
for resource allocation decisions is
one that concerns accountants too.
For example, a number of capital
expenditure proposals might be
evaluated according to payback,
average annual return, rate of re
turn, net present value, and risk
adjusted return on investment.
Some persons would seek to ascer
tain which project was the best
performer across a broad range of
investment selection methods: the
methodology outlined in this study,
however, attempts to reduce the
number of selection models, thereby
enabling the decision maker to dis
card those considered as unsuitable
and to focus his attention on one
or a few that have been indicated
as significantly more suitable than
others.
Two types of objections may be
raised to the scoring methodology:
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one relating to its external validity,
the other to the authenticity of its
theoretical assertions.
Within the R & D area future ap
plication would appear doubtful for
a pragmatic reason. For firms to
develop their own sets of criteria
and associated characteristics the
costs would be high: the weights
would differ according to major
classes of R & D, firm adaptation
over time, and the changing avail
ability of funds. Continuous update
and revision would therefore be
necessary. If the methodology is
extended into other areas, there
would be similar impracticalities.
Without tangible evidence that the
benefits of (say) rejecting a signif
icantly unsuitable selection model
outweigh the costs anticipated, and,
that the net benefit to be gained
is greater than that associated with
the ad hoc methods presently used,
the value of the methodology must
remain unsubstantiated.
Irrespective of the costs and ben
efits, the question is whether or not
the measure is internally sound.
The author’s application to 26 mod
els cannot be regarded as validat
ing or invalidating the index. Even
though the results illustrate very
little discrimination between the
models this can be interpreted posi
tively as meaning that the models
were similar, or negatively in that
the models were very different and
the index failed to recognize this.
The only criterion used was that
the models represent a cross-section
of model types.
The application of the impor
tance-weights highlights another
limitation of a measurement-theo
retic kind. In the research, the R&D
respondents were required to rank
order the five criteria from most
important to least important using
a 1-5 scale. But by the placing of
numbers on these criteria rankings,
an arbitrary measurement unit is
implied. An ordering makes no
assertions about the intensity of the
measure—common sense dictates
that one cannot maintain that 65°F
is twice as hot as 32°F (freezing
point).
Despite the failure of the author
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to successfully validate the index
as a meaningful study of the suit
ability of a management science
model, the study is of interest.
Paul A. Griffin
The Ohio State University

The Case for Universal Profes
sional Development by W. P.

Sprague, The CPA Journal, Sep
tember, 1973.
Mr. Sprague gives argument to
the position of requiring continu
ing education of practitioners in
order to renew their licenses to
practice public accounting.

The article first considers the fact
that many CPAs are alarmed at the
thought of anyone requiring them
to continue their education or lose
their CPA certificates. The real ef
fect of requiring continuing edu
cation would be upon the practi
tioners; the practitioner would par
ticipate in continuing education or
his license would not be renewed.
Consideration of the objections to
continuing education indicates that
the key issue is whether universal
professional development is unrea
sonably burdensome.
Since most sources favor 40
hours of continuing education to
be an acceptable goal, the ques
tion of “unreasonably burdensome”
must be centered upon factors
other than time. Mr. Sprague of
fers several avenues of approach
around problems of cost, conven
ience, and availability. These ave
nues include more AICPA and
state society programs, closed cir
cuit television, and home study
courses.
Education

Mr. Sprague suggests the imple
mentation of a required continuing
education program should include
a complete freedom of choice as to
the subject matter except for the
requirement of a single course of
study in current matters significant
to all aspects of public practice.
The article lists several possible

sources of education, indicating
that all practitioners, whether from
a large firm or a small firm, could
reach the required level of educa
tion.
Enactment of substantial penal
ties for non-compliance and the
random inspection of individual
records could help solve the prob
lem of enforcing continuing educa
tion requirements. Mr. Sprague
also suggests use of license renewal
forms which would require listing
of courses taken during the year.
Application of continuing educa
tion requirements should be mod
est at first. Greater requirements
may be implemented after initial
acceptance by the profession. Mr.
Sprague suggests several things the
state societies could do to help im
plement any continuing education
requirement. These actions include:

1. Expansion of course material
to cover a broader range of pro
fessional development.
2. Differentiation of course ma
terial to fit various levels of exper
ience.
3. Translation of course material

Sure, you’ve got your
own problems.

But are they really as
important as hers?
Thanks to Easter Seal care, my little
friend Rachel has hopes for a brighter
future. Along with a lot of other kids.
You know, it really helps crippled kids
to know somebody cares. And, if you
don’t, who will? So please . . . give to
Easter Seals. I’d appreciate it. And so
would the children.
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into workbook and cassette form.
4. Refinement of administrative
procedures to include documenta
tion of attendance and recording
of quiz grades.
5. Dissemination of the pro
grams through the available edu
cational facilities.
Misconceptions

The article considers three mis
conceptions. One misconception is
that continuing education is no
guarantee of competence. Mr.
Sprague concedes that the benefit
derived from a course might vary
from person to person; however,
the purpose of requiring continuing
education is not to insure a defin
able level of competence among the
practitioners. The purpose of the
requirement is to demonstrate to
the public that the profession is
concerned enough to attempt to
maintain and improve professional
competence. The second miscon
ception concerns the effect that
well-publicized court cases may
have on continuing education. The
author answers this claim by point
ing out that faulty judgment on an
engagement has little to do with
continuing education. The hazards
of the profession should not be
confused with basic knowledge.
The last misconception concerns
the rejection of in-house training
programs of the larger firms be
cause of highly publicized lawsuits.
Mr. Sprague counters that argu
ment by pointing out the advan
tage that the firm has in a case
such as the one mentioned. The
firm can better evaluate the need
of its staff, and it can require at
tendance by its staff.
The author concludes by noting
the approaches taken by some of
the states now requiring continu
ing education. Many of these states
support voluntary rather than
forced continuing education. The
opponents to required continuing
education stress that voluntary pro
grams would involve the majority
of the practitioners.
William D. Wallace
Oklahoma State University
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A Typology for Participation in
Organizational Decision Making

by Joseph A. Alutto and James A.
Belasco, Administrative Science
Quarterly, March, 1972.

After reviewing the literature on
participation in organizational de
cision making, it is argued that par
ticipation should be viewed as the
difference between the number of
decisions in which an individual
actually participates and the num
ber in which he desires to partici
pate. A rather extensive field study
was conducted in an attempt to
test the usefulness of this discrep
ancy view. In addition to providing
support for the concept, the find
ings indicate that some of the tra
ditional assumptions concerning the
universal desirability of increased
participation in decision making
should be modified.
Alutto and Belasco note that the
prior literature on individual par
ticipation in organizational decision
making has typically assumed a
linear relationship between in
creased participation and such
valued organizational outcomes as
the willingness to adopt change,
increased administrative control,
and greater individual integration
in the organization. Researchers
and practitioners alike have sug
gested that by encouraging partici
pation, the organization can in
crease both the likelihood that a
change will be adopted as well as
the overall effectiveness of the
change. Others have stated that in
creased participation by an indi
vidual leads to greater individual
job satisfaction and work achieve
ment as well as greater individual
integration into the organization.
Some authors have argued that
participation encourages subordi
nate commitment to organizational
goals through involvement in the
decision process, thus allowing su
periors to gain both an increased
certainty concerning the actions of
the subordinate and an increased
influence over subordinate behav
ior.
This view is clearly evident in

the literature of accounting con
cerned with the control aspects of
budgeting. It has been suggested
that allowing the budgeted indi
vidual to participate in the goal
setting process encourages accep
tance of the budget and, to some
extent, insures increased perform
ance by the budgeted individual.
In addition to the over-simplic
ity of the assumed relationships,
Alutto and Belasco are critical of
the previous adherence to an ab
solute measure of participation, i.e.,
the number of institutional deci
sions in which an individual par
ticipates. It is unlikely, they argue,
that the desire for increased par
ticipation is equally distributed
throughout the organization. To
the extent that such desires are not
equally distributed, the crucial va
riable would seem to be the dis
crepancy between current and de
sired rates of participation rather
than an individual’s absolute rate.
One can deal effectively with de
cisional participation by consider
ing a continuum of participation
typified by three conditions:

(1) Decisional deprivation—ac
tual participation in fewer than de
sired decisions;
(2) Decisional equilibrium—ac
tual participation in as many deci
sions as desired;
(3) Decisional saturation— actual
participation in more decisions
than desired.
If the three participation condi
tions are differentially distributed
throughout organizational popula
tions, and if these conditions are
related to differing organizational
outcomes, then the discrepancy
concept of participation has not
only research and theoretical value
but practical implications as well.
In an effort to test the discrep
ancy concept and to shed addi
tional light upon the relationship
between increased involvement in
decision making and the organiza
tional outcomes previously dis
cussed, a field study was conducted
among teachers employed by two
schools in New York. Using a ques
tionnaire survey technique, the
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teachers indicated their actual and
desired participation concerning 12
decisional situations varying from
the hiring of new faculty members
to the planning of new buildings.
Based upon these responses each
of the 454 teachers was placed
within one of the three discrepancy
conditions. In addition to demo
graphic information, data was ob
tained concerning six correlates of
participation: (1) organizational
commitment; (2) perceptions and
preferences of administrative in
fluence; (3) authoritarianism; (4)
role conflict; (5) interpersonal
trust; and (6) attitudes toward mil
itancy (teacher strikes).
The authors found that organiza
tional commitment and the person
ality characteristics of interpersonal
trust and authoritarianism were not
differentially distributed among in
dividuals with varying decisional
attributes. The most significant
finding was that decisional depri
vation did not lead to lower organ
izational commitment than equili
brium or saturation. No significant
differences were evident between
teachers considered decisionally
saturated and those in equilibrium.
However, those teachers experienc
ing decisional deprivation ranked
school superintendents as currently
more influential, desired a reduc
tion in future administrative influ
ences, experienced more role con
flict, and were the most militant of
the three groups. An analysis of the
within-group variations of deci
sional involvement revealed that
the larger the number of decisions
in which participation is desired
but not allowed, (a) the greater
the perceived role conflict, (b) the
greater the probability that the in
dividual is a male employed in a
rural secondary school, (c) the
greater the attitudinal militancy,
and (d) the higher the probability
that the top administrative official
will be perceived as relatively in
fluential.
The study indicates that organi
zational typologies based on over
all conditions of decisional par
ticipation are viable. Individuals
experiencing high levels of depri
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vation do possess different charac
teristics than those typified by
lower levels of deprivation, by
equilibrium, or by saturation. No
evidence was found in support of
the assumption that increased par
ticipation leads to increased organi
zational commitment. For at least
two segments of each organiza
tional population (equilibrium and
saturation) the introduction of
shared decision making is not a
viable administrative strategy and
may prove highly dysfunctional.
While further research is certainly
necessary, it would appear that the
notion, prevalent in accounting,
that increased commitment to a
budget (and thus increased per
formance) can be achieved by in
volving the budgeted individual in
the goal-setting process is some
what suspect.
W. Bruce Johnson
The Ohio State University

The Implications for Accountants
of Data Base Management Sys
tems by Ron Weber, The Austra

lian Accountant, October, 1973.

Data base management systems
will become an accepted facet of
commercial data processing in the
near future. The purpose of this
article is (1) to explain the general
nature of these systems and (2) to
suggest some implications of these
systems for the accounting profes
sion.
In a well-organized presentation,
Mr. Weber points out that data
base management systems have
several aims. The first and primary
aim is to reduce the duplication of
data that is stored in company files.
This duplication occurs frequently
in traditional computer systems,
and it leads to several inefficiencies
in data processing. These inefficien
cies are as follows: (1) more file
storage space is required, (2) data
are sometimes updated in one file
but not in another, and (3) deci
sion makers must search in many
different files to satisfy their infor

mational requirements. Data base
management systems attempt to
overcome these inefficiencies by us
ing special file structures for data
storage. These structures are de
signed so that the data appearing
on a particular record is stored in
only one place. Then, this data is
systematically linked with other
data to form many different files.
The second aim of data base
management systems is to alleviate
many of the problems associated
with system development and mod
ification. This goal is achieved by
utilizing computer programs which
can be quickly written and easily
modified. Many subroutines are
standard, and they are usually writ
ten by the computer manufacturer.
As a result, there is less need for
system users to write highly-de
tailed computer programs.
As one would naturally expect,
there are some problems associated
with data base management sys
tems. One problem is that a failure
in the system can be disastrous. Be
cause of the linking network, data
violations affect every file to which
the data is connected. This prob
lem is most acute to those system
users who have fast retrieval re
quirements. Because of this prob
lem, managers should implement
appropriate recovery measures de
signed to reduce the impact of a
system failure. These measures in
clude dual copies of files, file
moves, file dumps, and copies of
journals that contain all changes in
the data base.
A second problem of data base
management systems is their sus
ceptibility to violations of data
secrecy. Because of this susceptibil
ity, it is important to implement
appropriate security measures such
as passwords, logging-in proce
dures, and so forth.
Implications for accountants

The implementation of data base
management systems has several
implications for accountants. First,
these systems facilitate the mana
gerial accountant’s work by en
hancing the accuracy and reliabil
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ity of the information that he uses.
In addition, since data can be
updated at tremendous speeds,
these systems have a positive effect
on information timeliness. Indeed,
the probability of satisfying ad hoc
information requests is greatly in
creased by these systems.
The financial accountant can also
profit from the implementation of
data base management systems.
The tremendous speed and data
structuring capacities of these sys
tems greatly facilitate the auditor’s
work. Moreover, these systems de
crease the risk of program manipu
lations since many of the subrou
tines are written by the computer
manufacturer.
Mr. Weber concludes by point
ing out that accountants are enter
ing a period of rapid change. Dur
ing the period, data base manage
ment systems will become an ac
cepted facet of commercial data
processing. These systems have
definite implications for the ac
counting profession. As a result, it
is imperative that accountants be
come actively interested in the de
velopment of these systems.
Keith G. Stanga
Louisiana State University
at Baton Rouge

Analysis of Current Marketing
Cost Methods by L. Gayle Ray
burn, The CPA Journal, November,

1973.

Despite the fact that determin
ing marketing costs is more diffi
cult than determining production
costs, efforts should be made by
both marketing and accounting
people to develop meaningful con
trols and establish accountability
of marketing costs.
This article relates the various
marketing cost methods currently
being used by businesses. For in
stance, the full costing method is
most generally used; although the
contribution margin approach is
also in evidence. Dr. Rayburn con
tends that the goal of marketing
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management should be segmental
contribution; however, in the con
tribution margin approaches being
used, the starting point has usually
been gross profit. As a result, all
production costs are presumed
variable with production. Since
fixed production costs are in effect
allocated, the segmental contribu
tion continues to reflect some com
mon costs.
Dr. Rayburn interviewed con
trollers of organizations in the
South with 100 employees or more.
All companies interviewed em
ployed standards and/or budgets
to reflect management’s financial
goals. Those marketing costs which
are repetitive are subjected to the
same methods of cost control as
production costs. However, the
standards employed for cost con
trol are less exact than those used
in production.
Nonrepetitive marketing costs,
such as advertising and sales pro
motion, are primarily controlled
through the use of budgets. Stand
ard costs for advertising and sales
promotion are not based on units
which measure effort expended, but
rather on units which measure re
sults obtained. None of the com
panies interviewed had conducted
time and motion studies of non
repetitive marketing activities,
which would identify how these
employees spend their time in or
der to develop appropriate unit
standards.
Marketing cost allocations are
generally made on the basis of sales
price, despite the fact that a direct
relationship between orders and
costs cannot be established. Mar
keting management often dislikes
such allocations, because profit po
tential is not revealed.
Marketing controls neglected

Distribution cost variance anal
ysis is virtually non-existent among
the companies interviewed. Net
variances may be indicated, but a
breakdown into causal factors is
not attempted. A substitute often
followed is a comparison of current
and prior period distribution costs.

Such comparisons will help to iden
tify a problem area, but fail to in
dicate the adjustment required.
One company indicated the use
of industry statistics as a means of
cost control. However, difficulties
arise because of a lack of uniform
ity in both the methods of distribu
tion and in. the methods of charg
ing items to distribution costs.
Generally, the survey reveals that
while marketing costs are relatively
large in many businesses, they
have not received the attention
they deserve if worthwhile control
and accountability is desired. Mar
keting activities have changed. To
day they often must create and
discover demands for new products
rather than merely sell what is pro
duced. Marketing management is
becoming an integral part of every
phase of the production-distribu
tion cycle. Economic factors also
affect marketing costs. As more
products are produced, more effort
is expended to find additional cus
tomers and open new territories.
All of these factors result in in
creased marketing costs and mean
ingful controls become more de
sirable.
Several reasons are presented for
the slow application of accounting
methods to marketing costs. First,
the marketing environment is much
more complex than that in the pro
duction area. For instance, the time
period lag between cause and ef
fect, the lack of standardization in
marketing operations, and the vast
ly different channels of distribu
tion available are cited as reasons
for lack of cost control. Second,
often quantitative factors are not
available to measure the results of
performance. The human element
is more pronounced in marketing
areas than in the production activ
ity. Third, there has been a lack
of communication between what
analysis is needed versus what data
are available. The accountant
simply has not familiarized himself
with the marketing functions to the
same extent as the production
function.
JoAnn S. DeVries
Oklahoma State University
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